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RECENT CASE NOTES
AGENCY -

HOSPITALS -

NEGLIGENCE IN TREATMENT

Plaintiff was a paying patient in defendant hospital, a profitmaking organization. A qualified laboratory technician, employed
by the hospital, made a serological test to determine plaintiff's
blood factor. The test was made in contemplation of, and preliminary to, a blood transfusion ordered for plaintiff by her physician. An error was made by the technician in designating the blood
factor and plaintiff was infused with blood of the wrong factor
and suffered serious consequences. Held: The act of the technician is medical in nature, not administrative, and therefore the
hospital is immune from liability. Berg v. New York Society for
the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, 286 App. Div. 783, 146
N.Y. Supp. 2d 548 (1955) (3-1 decision).
The basic agency doctrine of respondeat superior requires that
a principal, as a general rule, be vicariously liable for the acts of
his agent. Although the precise definition of "agent" will vary
slightly depending upon which theory is used to rationalize the doctrine, as a general proposition, for purposes of application of respondeat superior, "agent" includes any person over whom the
principal has control of either the person or method or manner of
performance of the agency. If control is exercised over only the
end result, the principal will not be vicariously liable.
The principal case followed the general rule that a hospital is
immune from liability for the acts of its employees if the acts
are medical and not administrative in nature. Steinert v. Brunswick
Home, Inc. 172 Misc. 787, 20 N.Y. Supp. 2d 459 (1940). See
Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E. 2d 596 (1940).
But the court sensed an injustice in its decision and challenged
the higher court to a "reappraisal of the underlying rationale."
The rationale, however, seems to be merely a satisfactory application of the control concept of respondeat superior. Hillyer v.
The Governors of St. Bartholomew'sHospital,2 K.B. 820, 9 B.R.C.
1 (1909); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y.
125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Necolayff v. Genessee Hospital, 270
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App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y. Supp. 2d 832, aff'd, 296 N.Y.36, 73
N.E. 2d 177 (1949). The court apparently believes that where
the negligent acts are medical in nature the hospital should not
be considered as having control; therefore it should not be liable
for such acts because they are inherently discretionary, founded
upon the professional skill of the patient's physician as exercised
by himself or his agents.
When applying the general rule, difficulty in making the distinction between medical and administrative acts has been a source
of injustice, and the difficulties are traceable to the first New York
application of the "medical-administrative" rule. That opinion
stated that "acts of preparation immediately preceding the operation are necessary to its successful performance, and are really a
part of the operation itself... [w]hatever the nurse does in those
preliminary states is done not as a servant of the hospital, but in
the course of treatment of the patient." Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). The
statement led subsequent decisions astray in defining "medical,"
as is illustrated by the definition in the prinicipal case that a medical act is any act "immediately and integrally related to the medical care and treatment prescribed for the patient.., no matter how
simple or how far removed from the common concept of a professional act." See also Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239
N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924). Such definitions are conceivably
broad enough to encompass any act performed subsequent to the
initiation of the treatment. Consequently, those definitions must
be deemed arbitrary and unsatisfactory because they do not have
as their focal point the element of discretion which is paramount
in the underlying rationale of the general rule.
A reconsideration of the general rule should be directed not
toward its rationale, as suggested by the court in the principal
case, but toward its application, which requires determination
of which acts are medical in nature and which are administrative.
A redefinition of terms, promulgated with the rationale in mind,
is made mandatory by the frequent injusticies in the field. Perhaps,
as the principal case suggests, legislative action would be an even
better step forward.
Arthur C. Flinders.
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RECENT CASE NOTES
LAW-EMINENT

DOMAIN-COMPENSATION

FOR

TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

Twin City Power Company was the owner of land and water
rights which it had acquired pursuant to its plan to build a dam and
hydroelectric power plant in the Savannah River, a navigable
tream. Congress, however, decided the United States should build
the dam as part of its plan of improving the Savannah River basin,
the project calling for the complete absorption of all Twin City
property. Commissioners appointed by the court below valued the
land of Twin City at $267 per acre considering its value in connection with water power development. The United States was
overruled in its contention that the land should be valued according to its agricultural worth, $37 per acre, without regard for its
riparian character. Held: The United States has a dominant servitude in the flow of a navigable river which value it can grant or
withhold as it chooses; hence the United States can not be compelled to pay any value that the proximity of this stream added to

the land. United States v. Twin City Power Company, 350 U.S.
222 (1956).
That Congress can condemn private land and take it for the
public interest is not here contested, but when Congress exercises
this right and there is a taking of private property for public purposes, just compensation must be paid. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V;

Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312
(1893). The one from whom the property is taken must be put in
as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been
taken. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934). The highest
and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and
needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered, and the
fact that the most profitable use of a parcel can be made only in
combination with other lands does not necessarily exclude that
use from consideration if the possibility of combination is reasonably sufficient to affect the market value. Olson v. United States,
supra. Since the owner is to receive no more than he is being deprived of, his award can not be added to by any gain to the taker.
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). In fixing compensation, possible, probable, or imaginary uses are not to be con-
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sidered in so far as they are so speculative as to have no effect
on market value. United States v. First National Bank, 250 F.2d
299 (1918). The inquiry in condemnation cases must be what
is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted. Boom Company

v. Patterson,98 U.S. 403 (1878).
The primary issue in the principal case would seem to be
whether the suitability of this land for the erection of a dam and
hydroelectric power plant is to be considered in determining the
fair market value or the reasonable compensation to be awarded
the landowner. The government contended that since it can grant
or withhold the right to utilize the water power in the river under
its power to regulate interstate commerce and improve navigation, it need not pay any value for the land based upon its suitability for use as a dam site. The majority opinion in the principal case cites the case of United States v. Chandler-Dunbar,W. P.
Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913), as authority for its holding. It is conceded that there is language in that case Which, applied here, could
lead to the result reached. It seems, however, that there is a distinguishing point in that the underlying contention of the ChandlerDunbar Company was that it had a vested property right in the
water power of the St. Mary's River in excess of all that needed
for navigational purposes. Any claim based upon such a contention would be justly disallowed. It has always been the law in this
country that a riparian owner does not acquire a property right
distinct from those of the general public in the waters of a navigable stream. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S.
386 (1945). In the Chandler-Dunbarcase the Court in addition to
denying any compensation for the actual water in the river also
held that no additional value need be paid for eight acres of upland bordering on the falls and rapids of the river because of its
suitability for a factory site, power for the factory to come from
horsepower generated by the current of the river. The Court said
these additional values were based upon the erroneous hypothesis
that the company had a private property interest in the water
power of the river.
Here Twin City does not claim ownership of any part of the
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water in the Savannah River. All it asks is the fair market value
of the land taken. That the land had a market value based upon
its suitability for a dam site is evidenced by the fact that for some
years private purchasers had been negotiating with Twin City for
the purchase of the same land in question, and had ceased their
efforts only when it was announced that the government would
undertake the project. Had any of these companies been forced
to condemn the land they would have had to pay the added value
based upon the suitability of the land for power purposes. It
would certainly seem the Government should have to pay the same
fair market value when it takes the same land for the same purpose.
In applying the holding in the Chandler-Dunbarcase to the
facts of the principal case the court seems to have lost sight of
"fair market value" as the test for just compensation. The authority for such an abrogation of the test is at best questionable, and
the justice therein nonexistant.

Oscar Fields, Jr.

EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

Defendant, on trial before a United States District Court, moved
to quash his indictment on the ground that, prior to being questioned as a witness before the grand jury, he was not advised of his
Constitutional right against self-incrimination. He alleged that he
had been "marked ... for prosecution" and that the authorities
were engaged in bringing about his indictment. Held: The mere
fact that a witness may later be indicted furnishes no basis for
requiring that he be warned of his rights under the Fifth Amendment when summoned to give testimony before a grand jury.
United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution embodied the English right against self incrimination which as late
as 1789 was still new and ill-defined. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 120. The privilege that "no person shall.., be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself" has also been inserted in virtually all state constitutions. The privilege is not that
a person has a right to refuse to submit to questioning, but that
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he has a right to refuse to answer certain questions. As Professor
Wigmore says, the Constitutional provision is an "option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265
(3rd ed. 1940).
The right of a defendant to refuse to be sworn as a witness is
traced not to the Constitution, but to 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948),

which provides that in trial of persons charged with commission
of offenses, the person charged shall, at his own request and not
otherwise, be a competent witness. This statute is a modification
of the common law rule, prevailing even in this country until the
mid-1800's, that the accused was incompetent as a witness, either
for or against himself. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra, § 65; In re

Lemon, 15 Cal. App.2d 82, 59 P.2d 213 (1936). Where, however,
the person appears before a grand jury, without having been formally charged, he has no right to remain off the witness stand.
United States v. Price, 163 Fed. 904 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); Ex
Parte Barnes, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 583, 166 S.W. 728 (1914). Moreover, as to a witness other than the accused, it is not violative of
Constitutional privilege for the court or grand jury to fail to warn

such a witness. People v. Smith, 257 Mich. 319, 241 N.W. 186
(1932); WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1123 (11th ed. 1935);
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896); Powers v. United

States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
The district court, in denying Scully's motion, based its decision
on the distinction between a party and a mere witness. 119 F.
Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). A witness, before a court of law or
a grand jury, has a constitutional right to refuse to answer a question which may tend to incriminate him. Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273 (1919). He may not refuse to be sworn, and need
not be warned of his privilege, but to avail himself of it the witness
must plead it to each incriminating question. United States v. Benjamin, 120 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1941). A person becomes a party,
however, when formal charge is made against him, by indictment
presented or information filed in court or by complaint before
a magistrate, and it would be error in a criminal case to call a
party defendant as a witness unless he waives his right to remain
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off the stand. United States v. Housing Foundation of America,
Inc., 176 F.2d 665 (3rd Cir. 1949). In the present case, no formal
charge having been brought against the defendant, the district
court ruled that Scully's rights were merely those of a witness and
that no warning was necessary.
Judge Medina, speaking for the majority of the Court of Appeals, came to the same conclusion, but criticized the rationale of
the district court. His opinion was based on the position that the
grand jury, not being charged with the duty of deciding innocence
or guilt, should not be required to conduct its proceedings with the
"assiduous regard for the preservation of procedural safeguards
which normally attend the ultimate trial of the issues."
The concurring opinion of Judge Frank expressed a diametric.
ally opposing concept of the grand jury. He asserted that every
witness should be warned of his rights when a question plainly
calls for an incriminating answer, especially if the interrogation
occurs before a grand jury, where the witness does not have the
aid of counsel. Judge Frank grudgingly concurs in the result because of earlier Supreme Court rulings which he feels constrained
to follow, "absent... decisions indicating clearly a new doctrinal
trend."
The great weight of authority in this country seems to be in
accord with the holding of the lower court that the witness-party
distinction is the prime consideration in determining both the
right to receive a warning and the right to refuse to testify. A
number of decisions have expressed the same conclusion as Judge
Frank in the instant case, but such is still a minority rule. The
opinion by Judge Medina is certainly a shift to the other side of
the scale. Though it be true that a grand jury does not convict,
nor does it punish, nevertheless the grand jury is an integral part
of our criminal law procedure. The grand jury indictment is the
starting gun which signals the beginning of criminal proceedings,
and it would thus seem that the rights of one before a grand jury
are as much a part of our procedural safeguards as those pertaining to the actual trial of the accused.

Robert H. Thomas.
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FEDERAL COURTS-INJUNCTION-EFFECT ON STATE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS

After indictment by federal grand jury for illegal acquisition
of marihuana, petitioner successfully moved to suppress evidence
obtained by an improperly issued search warrant, and the United
States District Court dismissed the indictment. A federal narcotics
agent then swore to a complaint before a New Mexico judge, and
petitioner was charged with possession of marihuana in violation
of New Mexico law. Petitioner brought an action in the United
States District Court to enjoin the agent from testifying with respect to the narcotics obtained in the illegal search. Held: The
federal agent should be enjoined from testifying in the state case.

Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (5-4 decision).
Federal courts have traditionally exercised reluctance in interfering with the prosecution of criminal actions in state courts.
Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). The relationship between federal and state jurisdiction has been described by
Mr. Justice Holmes as a "very delicate matter," 5 The Sacco-Ven.
zetti Case, Transcript of the Record 5516, and the Supreme Court
has emphasized numerous times the regard which must be had
for the independence of state governments in the administration of
criminal justice. Beal v. Missouri Pacific RR, 312 U.S. (1941);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Federal district
courts have jurisdiction to prevent trials of persons whose constitutional rights would be invaded by such actions. United States
ex rel Buchalter v. Lowenthal, 108 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1940).

However, the fact of unconstitutional action will not, of itself,
invoke federal equity powers. Spillman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
295 U.S. 89 (1935). Exhaustion of state remedies is usually
required, Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948), unless circumstances are extraordinary and danger of irreparable loss is great

and immediate. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926). Apart
from the injunction power in unconstitutional activity, federal
courts are authorized to stay state proceedings when necessary
"in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2283 (1948).
The principal case is distinguished from those above in that the
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injunction did not operate to enjoin directly the state officials from
prosecuting the petitioner; this is emphasized by the majority
opinion. The dissent looked beyond the form to the effect of barring the evidence on which the State's case wholly depended, and
found the state proceeding quite effectively stultified, even though
the appearance of the agent would have been voluntary and no
subpoena had been issued. The court has earlier refused to enjoin
the use of evidence illegally obtained by state officials, saying that
the "balance is against the wisdom" of using such power. Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). A lower federal court has held
the criteria for federal intervention to be the same whether the
action be designed to enjoin or impair the effective state prosecution. McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D.C. Md. 1951).
It is now well-established that although evidence obtained by
federal officials in an illegal search is inadmissible in a federal
court as being violative of the 4th and 5th amendments, Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), state use of illegally obtained
evidence does not violate due process of law within the meaning
of the 14th amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
See Ray, Restrictions on the Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence,
9 Sw. L.J. 434. The majority in the principal case discounted any
constitutional issues, however, and rested the result on the court's
"supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies." Had
there been a federal rule barring participation by federal agencies
with illegally obtained evidence in state trials, it would seem the
injunction should clearly be issued. Booke v. Comingore, 177 U.S.
459 (1900); US ex rel Touhy, 340 U.S. 462 (1951). In the
absence of such a rule, the suggestion of a general supervisory
power over law enforcement within the judicial branch seems to
be a new approach, as emphasized by the dissent, in the delicate
area of federal-state relations. We are not told what effect, if any,
the fact that proceedings were first commenced in the federal court
had on the opinion, or what result would have emerged if the
federal indictment had never been found.
Prosecution on the basis of illegally seized evidence may seem
a gross injustice, but the doctrine of the Wolf case, supra, must be
kept in mind. Although the appearance of the federal agent in the
state proceeding might have violated the spirit of the federal rules,
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it is submitted that enjoining the testimony must be viewed as a
federal impairment of state prosecution, heretofore justified only
in exceptional circumstances where denial of basic liberties is
clear. The Wolf case having held use of illegally seized evidence
to be no such denial, to allow an injunction to issue here seems
inconsistent.
William D. Powell, Jr.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-COMMUNITY PROPERTY-LIFE INSURANCE

PROCEEDS

H and W were killed in an automobile accident, H surviving W
some fifteen or thirty minutes. H's life was insured under three
policies, premiums for two of which were paid out of community
funds. W was beneficiary under each policy, and if she should
predecease H then the proceeds were to be paid to his estate. W's
heirs by a former marriage brought an action against the heirs of
H, and sought to have the proceeds declared part of the community estate, and hence divided between the separate estates of H and
W. Held: Where the husband is insured with W named as beneficiary and W predeceases him, the proceeds of the policy belong
to the separate estate of H, even though the premiums were paid
out of community funds. Warthan v. Haynes ...... Tex ....... , 288
S.W.2d 481 (1956) (6-3 decision).
The historical path of insurance as related to the community
property laws of Texas has been a winding one. One of the most
troublesome problems has been whether or not an insurance policy
is to be considered property. In 1943, the Supreme Court of Texas,
in a frequently cited case, held that an insurance policy was a
chose in action, declaring flatly that the policy was property.
Womack v. Womack, 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307. A decade
later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was confident enough of
the proposition and its authority to say, "It is now well settled that
a policy of life insurance is regarded in Texas as property." Kemp
v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953). Only
a few months later, however, the Supreme Court of Texas referred
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to the rationale of the Womack case as erroneous dictum. Sherman
v. Roe- ......-Tex ....... 262 S.W.2d 393 (1953).
In the majority of community property jurisdictions, the husband is not allowed to change the beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life so as to divest the wife's claim to it without her
consent. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74
P.2d 27 (1937). Cases in some of the other community property
jurisdictions hold that the proceeds of an insurance policy are
community assets regardless of who may be named as beneficiary
in the policy. Thus, where the husband takes out a policy on his
life, payable to a third party, and pays the premiums out of community funds, the wife may upon death of the husband demand
one-half of the proceeds and the named beneficiary take the
remaining half as a gift from the husband out of his share of the
proceeds. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fancher,219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482
(1933). In the situation where the policy is on the life of the
husband payable to the wife, however, it is reasoned that the husband has made a gift of his share of the proceeds to the wife, and
the entire proceeds are thus her separate property. Nulsen v. Herndon, 176 La. 1097, 147 So. 359 (1933). Texas not only is in
accord with the latter rule, but carries it much further, allowing
the husband, as manager of the community estate, to make a gift
of community property to a third person without express consent
of the wife, Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 14 S.W. 285 (1890) ;
Huie, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS AS APPLIED TO LIFE INSURANCE, 18 TEX. L. REV. 121 (1940), and accordingly allowing a
third party to be named as beneficiary of an insurance policy on
the husband's life. Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W.
624 (1901).
It would seem incorrect, however, to allow the husband to make
a gift to himself or his separate estate such as occurred in the
McAllister case. There, the policy insured W's life and H was
beneficiary. The case held, upon the decease of W, that there was
no property until after W's death, thus no property until after
termination of the community, and hence the proceeds were the
separate property of H. H, as manager of the community assets,
had augmented his personal estate at the expense of the community estate.
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The McAllister case was cited with approval in Volunteer State
Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 145 Tex. 245, 197 S.W.2d 105 (1946),
which held that the proceeds of the policy on the life of the husband do not vest in the beneficiary named by him until his death.
The majority of the court in the principal case relied heavily on
the Volunteer case, and reasoned that since the policy and its..roceeds never vested in the wife, and vested in the husband's estate
only after termination of the community by death of the parties,
then the policy proceeds were the separate property of the husband. A very convincing dissent by Justice Garwood is based
upon the premise that the policy is property, and the chose in
action purchased with community funds becomes the property of
the community estate immediately upon the inceltion of the
contract.
At least one far reaching result may occur from this case. As
the dissenting opinion points out, the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 seems to assume that life insurance proceeds are community
property to the extent that the policy is paid for with community
premiums. Thus, only one-half of the proceeds of a policy paid for
with community funds is included in the taxable estate of the
decedent for estate tax purposes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2056(c) (2). In the instant case, the Commissioner might require
all the proceeds to be accounted for in the estate of the insured
deceased spouse since they are the husband's separate property.
If, however, the wife had survived and received all the proceeds
as beneficiary, it could be argued that there should be no inclusion
in the deceased husband's estate tax return.
At any rate, the winding path referred to above has not been
materially straightened by this case. The question as to whether
an insurance contract is property remains unsettled, and in view
of the strong dissent, the case would be a weak foundation upon
which to build and argue.
Robert H. Thomas

RECENT CASE NOTES
LABOR LAW -

SECONDARY BOYCOTT -

THE

"ALLY

DOCTRINE"

Defendant labor union struck against Royal Typewriter Company. During the strike, Royal instructed customers with whom
it had repair contracts to select any independent repair company,
have the repairs made, and send the bill to Royal for reimbursement. The union, admittedly for the purpose of exerting greater
pressure on Royal, picketed four independent repair companies
which, at the request of Royal's customers, were performing a
large part of the work covered by Royal repair contracts. The only
contact which Royal had with the independents was the payment
of repair bills. Held: Picketing of an independent is lawful, even
though it has no contract with the primary employer, when the
independent performs work which might break a strike of which
it had notice. NationalLabor Relations Board v. Business Machines
Union, 228 F.2d 553 (2nd Cir. 1955).
The common law was inclined to hold secondary boycotts unlawful, Iron Moulders Union v. Allis Chalmers, 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir.
1908), while the Taft-Hartley Act makes illegal any attempt to
induce employees to engage in a concerted refusal to perform
services where the object of the refusal is to force their employer
to cease doing business with another employer. 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (4). Both approaches limit the use of secondary boycotts, but
neither attempts to proscribe all types of secondary activity.
Rabouin v. N.L.R.B., 195 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1952). The question
arises as to where the line should be drawn. Inasmuch as the provisions of the statute relating to secondary boycotts are very general,
the courts have employed common law principles in their construction. N.L.R.B. v. Electrical Worker's Union, 225 F.2d 17 (7th
Cir. 1955).
Under the general rule, known as the "ally doctrine," where
there is a contract by the primary employer to farm-out work to
an independent, picketing of the independent is not a proscribed
secondary activity because by the contract the independent has
willingly become a party to the disagreement. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 (1950).
The doctrine is basically contractual in nature and has not been
applied to cases which do not involve a contract between the pri-
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mary employer and the independent. But the doctrine has not
always been applied, even where contracts existed, the result
being that the picketing was illegal. InternationalBrotherhood of
Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., supra. The National Labor Relations Board acknowledges that the dividing line between legal and
illegal boycotting is not susceptible to the application of a rigid
formula, and has, therefore, based its decisions on a balance
between the intent of Congress to outlaw secondary boycotts and
the intent to preserve the lawful primary means traditionally used.
Re United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949).
Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp.
672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), held that a farm-out agreement was a
proper basis for the application of the "ally doctrine" where by
the agreement the secondary employer was doing seventy-five per
cent of the primary employer's work during the strike. The Douds
decision was used as authority for the decision in the principal
case, the court reasoning that there was a contractual relationship
by virtue of the independent's receipt of payment from Royal.
It is submitted that the principal case does not present the type
of contract situation that is contemplated by the "ally doctrine."
In fact, it is even questionable whether a contract situation existed.
There was no showing that the independents sided with either participant in the strike, or that any had done so in the past. The facts
stated do not indicate that any independent intended to help break
the strike, or that any independent was performing work in an
amount sufficient to break the strike. Neither was it shown that
any independent knew of the others' work. It seems that the independents merely accepted business at the request of the customers.
To say that the independents, by such acceptance, are thereby parties to the primary conflict merely because the payment by Royal
put the independents on constructive notice of the strike, is to say
that the independent can be limited in the scope of the business
which he may accept from customers by the mere existence of
a strike against another employer, even though the independent
remains neutral. That is the very result which the secondary boycott
provision seems designed to prohibit.
Arthur C. Flinders
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PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-

PRACTICE -

AIDING UNLICENSED PERSONS TO

FORFEITURE OF LICENSE

Appellant, a licensed medical doctor, was employed by a clinic
at a stated monthly salary. The clinic was owned by one who was
not a medical doctor and no medical doctor owned any interest in
the clinic. Appellant performed medical services and fees for
those services were collected by the clinic. The Texas State Board
of Medial Examiners revoked appellant's license to practice medicine for such conduct. Held: Appellant allowed another to make
use of his license to practice medicine in Texas, and the cancellation of his license is justified. Rockett v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 287 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref., n.r.e.
The police power of the state includes the power to enact comprehensive and rigid regulations for the practice of medicine and
dentistry. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923). TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. (1925) art. 4505 sec. 12 allows the State Board of Medical
Examiners to refuse to issue a license to anyone permitting another
to use his license to practice medicine in this state for the purpose
of treating or offering to treat sick or otherwise afflicted human
beings. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (1925) art. 4506 allows revocation
of a medical doctor's license to practice medicine for the same
reason. In view of this legislation it would seem that the primary
issue in the principal case would be whether or not the activities
of the above mentioned clinic constitute "the practice of medicine"
by its owner within the purview of art. 4505.
Courts have occasionally made a distinction between unlicensed
individuals or corporations actually practicing medicine, and
those merely employing licensed medical doctors and offering their

services to the public. State Electra Medical Institute v. State, 74
Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905). In approving the latter activity
the court said that the making of contracts for rendering medical
services was not practicing medicine, nor was the collection of
fees for performance of those services by qualified physicians in
their employ. The same distinction, however, was rejected in

People Ex Rel State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health
Corp., 12 Cal.2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1930). There the court
asserted that the policy of the law should not be circumvented by
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technical distinctions. The evils of divided loyalty and impaired
confidence which the law attempts to avoid seem to be present in
either approach. The majority rule, therefore, seems to be that
an individual or corporation who employs a physician to perform
medical services, paying the physician a salary and itself collecting the fee, thereby engages in the practice of medicine. Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App.2d 592, 52
P.2d 992 (1935); McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.
139 (1937); State Ex Rel Indiana State Board of Dental Examiners v. Boston System Dentists, 215 Ind. 485, 19 N.E. 949

(1939).
The Texas statutes expressly define who is regarded as practicing medicine. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (1925) art. 4510. A literal
reading of the statute would not seem to include an unlicensed
individual who merely employs and offers the services of a licensed physician, paying him a salary and collecting the fees. Only
by applying agency principles, i.e., what one does through employees he does himself, can we say that the owner of the clinic in
the principal case is engaged in the practice of medicine. It seems,
therefore, that the appellant could have been proceeded against
more properly under Sec. 4 of Art. 4505, which, together with
Art. 4506, make grossly unprofessional conduct of a character
which, in the opinion of the Board of Medical Examiners, is likely
to deceive or defraud the public a ground for revocation of a
physician's license. In State Board of Dental Examiners v. Savelle,
90 Colo. 177, 8 P.2d 693 (1932), the court held that the conduct
of a dentist in working for a corporation on a salary basis, the
corporation collecting the fees, was grossly unprofessional conduct
of a type constituting a fraud and misrepresentation on the public.
Apparently the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, with
whom the proceeding in the principal case was begun, did not
think the conduct of appellant was any deceit on the public.
The Texas case of Hexter Title and Abstract Co. v. Grievance
Committee of the Texas State Bar Association, 142 Tex. 506, 179
S.W.2d 946 (1944), holds that a title and abstract company which
employed attorneys on a salary basis to provide interested persons
with advice on the legal effect of instruments of conveyance, the
company collecting the fees therefor, was engaged in the practice
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of law. It would not seem, however, that this case should be considered too strong an authority for the holding in the principal
case, in view of the statute expressly defining who is engaged in
the practice of medicine and the absence of such a statute dealing
with who is engaged in the practice of law.
The opinion in the principal case seems clearly supported by
authority from other jurisdictions, and also in line with Texas
law, subject to the one criticism herein previously mentioned. The
case strikes a double blow at this type of arrangement between
employer and doctor, because not only will the physician be subject to having his license revoked, but probably also the employer
who hired him will be subject to criminal prosecution for practicing medicine without a license. TEX. PENAL CODE (1925) art. 730.
Oscar Fields, Jr.

TAXATION -

OIL AND GAS -

DEPLETABLE ECONOMIC INTEREST

In California where wells drilled into off-shore oil lands must
be slanted from the adjacent upland shores, Huntington Beach Co.
was an upland owner. Southwest Exploration Co. was an oil drilling company which acquired an easement from Huntington to use
its lands to drill wells into the off-shore oil deposits; in consideration for the easement, Southwest agreed to pay Huntington a percentage of net profits on the income derived from these wells.
Southwest computed its depletion deduction without excluding
from gross income the percentage of net profits paid to Huntington. Huntington, however, in computing its depletion included
the payments it received from Southwest. The two lower courts,
in upholding both deductions, allowed double depletion on the
same income. Held: Huntington Beach Co. is entitled to the deple.
tion deduction, because by contributing the easement which was
indispensable to the recovery of oil, it obtained an economic
interest. Commissioner v. Southwest ExplorationCo., 350 U.S. 308
(1956).
Allowance for depletion is a deduction equal to 27/2% of gross
income not to exceed 50% of the net income. I.R.C. Sec. 611
(1954), Sec. 23(m) (1939). A taxpayer is entitled to depletion
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if he has (1) "acquired by investment any interest in the oil in
place," and (2) "secured by... legal relationship income derived
from the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for the return

of his capital." Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933).
The issue in the principal case was whether the easement
conveyed by Huntington in exchange for the net profit payment
constituted an investment within the rule of Palmer v. Bender,
supra. The nature of the interest acquired by investment, not
the cost, is the important element. Burton-Sutton Co. v. Com'r.,
328 U.S. 25 (1946). Legal title to the land is not necessary. Kirby

Petroleum Co. v. Com'r., 326 U.S. 599 (1946). The landowner
or lessee who reserves a royalty, oil payment, or a percentage payment from net profits is generally entitled to take depletion;

Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); Kirby Petroleum Co.
v. Com'r, supra; but, in Helvering v. Elbe Oil Co. 303 U.S. 372
(1938), where the taxpayer conveyed his interest in producing
wells for 2/3 cash and reserved a net profits payment for the
other 1/3, the court held the conveyance to be a sale, and no depletion was allowed on the reserved interest. It seems that the effect
of the Elbe Oil case has been tempered by the subsequent BurtonSutton and Kirby cases, but in deciding Huntington Beach without
overruling the Elbe Oil decision, the court left unanswered the
question whether depletion would be allowed in a situation similar
to the Elbe Oil case, if the interest conveyed were indispensable
to exploitation.
Another problem, still unanswered, is that of the vendee who
purchases a net profits interest. It would seem that he would have
the same depletable interest as his vendor, but the court left this
conclusion uncertain by failing to overrule or distinguish the case
of Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370, (1938). In the O'Don.
nell case the taxpayer exchanged stock in a corporation for a net
profits payment from producing wells, and depletion was not
allowed. The indispensable nature of the investment distinguishes
the principal case from O'Donnel but, if O'Donnell is still the law,
the court has left a new problem of deciding what constitutes an
indispensable investment.
Huntington Beach might be equated to a line of cases in which
the operator, whether designated a contractor or a lessee, is entitled
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to take depletion. Spalding v. U.S., 97 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1938).
In James Ruston, 19 T.C. 284 (1952), the taxpayer was held to
have an economic interest where he had an exclusive right to
remove coal until the mine was exhausted. In Usibelli v. Com'r.,
229 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1955), where the mining contractor was
subject to the army's control in determining the amount of coal
removed, depletion was not allowed. It seems that the important
element in these cases is largely, though not exclusively, one of
agency, depletion being allowed if the contractor is independent,
but not if he is merely an employee. Although Huntington B~ach
clearly does not have the same control over extraction as the independent contractor, the nature of its upland position which made
Huntington indispensable, gave it effective control over the mineral's exploitation. The distinction between Usibelli and Huntington
Beach, therefore, would be that Huntington Beach, being an essential party, had control of the exploitation, and that Usibelli, being
neither an independent contractor nor an essential party, bad no
control.
Whether we say that Huntington had control of the exploitation,
or that its investment was indispensable to the extraction, the issue
is merely one of terminology, and the problem in future cases will
be defining the term used. The principal case will probably be
confined to its peculiar set of facts, but it does limit the import
of the O'Donnell and Elbe Oil decisions, and indicates a lenient
tendency of the court in defining what constitutes an interest
acquired by investment.

Neil 1. O'Brien.

TORTS -

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

DEFECTS IN PUBLIC WAYS

Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when a defective metal cover
embedded in a sidewalk gave way. The cover was on a box containing plumbing equipment installed for the benefit of the adjoining premises. This equipment, although installed in accordance
with the defendant municipal board's regulations, was for the
convenience of the owner and was paid for by him. In an action
for damages, plaintiff dismissed her action against the owners and
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tenants of the abutting premises, and the trial court dismissed the
action against the defendant board. Held: Equipment embedded
in the sidewalk for the benefit of the adjoining premises imposes
no duty upon a municipal board to maintain that equipment, and
therefore the board has no duty to discover its defective condition.

Johnson v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. 84 So.2d
229 (La. App. 1956).
The tort liability of a municipal corporation arising out of its
negligent acts is a curious mixture of the sovereign's immunity
and the private corporation's responsibility. The most frequently
used test holds that municipalities are immune for their torts arising out of so-called "governmental" functions but are responsible
for their "corporate" functions. Prunty v. City of Shreveport, 61
So. 2d 548 (La.App. 1952); Dilley v. City of Houston, 148 Tex.
191, 222 S.W. 2d 992 (1949). Although it is perhaps a distortion
of fact to classify the maintenance of public ways as a corporate
act, it is quite generally held that a municipality is liable for
injuries resulting from the defective condition of sidewalks. Thomason v. Dan Cohen Co., 7 So. 2d 396, (La.App. 1942); City of
Wichita Falls v. Crummer, 71 S.W. 2d 583 (Tex.Civ.App. 1934),

error dismissed.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the owner or tenant
of the adjoining proerty is under no duty to keep the sidewalk
in repair. Arata v. Orleans Capital Store, 55 So. 2d 239 (La.App.
1951); Latimer v. Walgreen Drug Co., 233 S.W. 2d 209 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950). However, where the abutting owner or tenant
uses the sidewalk for his own benefit or convenience, he is obligated to use reasonable care in maintaining the sidewalk in safe
repair. Hebert v. Boadon, 167 So. 862 (La.App. 1936); Derichs
v. O.K. Auto Partsand Sales Co., 92 S.W. 2d 465 (Tex.Civ.App.
1936) error dismissed. This exception to the general rule inludes
the liability attaching to an adjacent property owner maintaining
for his own benefit a covered opening on the sidewalk for injuries
caused by his failure to maintain the cover in a reasonably safe
condition. See cases collected in 63 C.J.S. 863 (b).
The mere fact that the person causing the defect is liable does
not of itself relieve the municipality from liability for defective
sidewalks. City of San Angelo v. Sitas, 143 Tex. 154, 183 S.W.

1956]
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2d 417 (1944). As the city is generally not involved in creating
the defect, the basis of its liability in this situation is found in the
failure to correct the defect. Therefore, the municipality is not
held in such cases unless it not only had notice of the defect, but
also had reasonable opportunity to remove it. Such notice may be
either express or implied, actual or constructive. Hudgens v. City
of New Orleans, 54 So.2d 536 (La.App. 1951); Hanks v. City of
Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 48 S.W. 2d 944 (1932).
In the principal case, the court does not rely on lack of notice,
but seems to extend the "benefit" test to relieve the municipality
from all liability rather than merely to charge the benefited owner
of the abutting premises with joint liability. Although the result
could be reconciled on the basis that the Sewerage and Water
Board's duties do not include the municipality's responsibility to
maintain safe sidewalks, the court does not rely on this distinction.
In addition, there is reference to the general rule that the city is
obligated to maintain the sidewalks in safe condition. Such an
omission might be interpreted as lessening the city's duties in this
respect.
Although it would clearly be just to hold the owner liable for
defective covered openings located in the sidewalk for his benefit,
it is submitted that sufficient reason exists for preserving the general rule. The continued liability of the city for injuries arising
from unsafe sidewalks of which it has notice retains the incentive
to protect the public in an authoritative and solvent obligor who is
well-equipped for discharging the duty involved. In the event a
loss is incurred, the municipality will generally be able to recover
from the guilty property owner. In those cases where a judgment
for indemnity is but an empty victory for the city, the loss will fall
upon the innocent party who was best able to have prevented the
injury. Continuation of municipal liability for defective sidewalks
will thus serve to protect the public way.
Granville Dutton

